We are excited to introduce ourselves as the new editors of the APSA Africa Workshop newsletter. After our wonderful University of Botswana colleagues Dorothy Mpabanga and Sethunya Mosime provided two years of great service, the team moves to West Africa and New York.

We hope to build on this cross-Atlantic partnership and make it a central aspect of the newsletter. During our time as participants in the 2012 workshop in Botswana, we became colleagues and friends—and part of a broader family. The goal of this newsletter is to keep this family strong by helping us find ways to collaborate; make educational and research trips throughout Africa and across the world; and discuss the cutting-edge scholarship that we are all doing.

Our new banner photo at the top of an Accra street provides the context for what we think the APSA Africa Workshop represents: People from far and wide on the go in a changing continent (and world), yet confronted with everyday congestion and colorful realities. We hope this newsletter provides you some scholarly insights into a changing Africa, as well a go-to resource for the most exciting research and educational opportunities on the continent. If nothing else, we hope you find it to be an enjoyable read while you are stuck in traffic.

Each issue will have a research symposium that focuses on an important topic of study. This issue kicks off our series with a close examination of grassroots politics in African elections. The topic is particularly timely as “Electoral October” subsumed Tanzania and Côte d’Ivoire (and several other countries), and Burkina Faso is poised to hold its polls soon.

Take a read, and we hope you like it!

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George M. Bob-Milliar
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With this issue, we introduce a new look and feel to the Alumni e-newsletter, along with a new editorial team! Please join me in welcoming George Bob-Milliar and Jeffrey Paller as our co-editors for the next two years. Both are alumni of the 2012 Workshop in Gaborone, Botswana; which seems especially fitting as we thank outgoing co-editors Dorothy Mpabanga and Sethunya Mosime, both University of Botswana faculty members.

Following this year’s Workshop in Nairobi, Kenya we conclude 8 years of Africa Workshops. In total, 230 scholars from across Africa, the United States, and Europe have taken part in the program. I hope this newsletter remains a useful tool for staying connected to the alumni community and to APSA.

As mentioned in the “Alumni News and Publications” section of this newsletter, several past leaders and participants were invited to present at this year’s APSA Annual Meeting in San Francisco, CA. For anyone interested in attending the 2016 APSA meeting in Philadelphia, PA, the Call for Proposals is now open. The deadline to submit proposals is January 8. See the Meeting Website for more information.

Best to all in the coming months and stay well!

Andrew Stinson
Manager, APSA
International Programs
astinson@apsanet.org
The 2015 APSA Africa Workshop was hosted by United States International University (USIU) in Nairobi, Kenya from July 20-31, marking the second time APSA’s Africa Workshop was held in Kenya. The two-week workshop on “Conflict and Political Violence” was led by John Clark (Florida International University, USA), Pamela Mbabazi (Mbarara University of Science & Technology, Uganda), Kennedy Mkutu (United States International University, Kenya), and Beth Elise Whitaker (University of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA).

Together with 26 participants from twelve different countries, the workshop leaders discussed research on the sources of armed conflict and mechanisms for resolving conflict. The course sought to situate research on African conflicts within the broader political science literature on peace and conflict and facilitate a dialogue between case-based and cross-national studies. Throughout their sessions, co-leaders grounded substantive analysis of the topics in a discussion of different methods used across the literature. In addition, participants had an opportunity to share their work and to receive helpful comments on their research projects.

For a much-needed break from the academic program, participants enjoyed some of Kenya’s rich wildlife during an overnight visit to Amboseli National Park. The following week, the group visited the entrepreneurial data collection/tech network Ushahidi (www.ushahidi.com) and attended a public symposium on “Avoiding the Resource Curse in Kenya” with guest speakers Professor Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o (Senator of Kisumu County) and Mr. Elijah Odondi (Deputy County Commissioner from Lokichar, South Turkana).

A special word of thanks is due to workshop co-leader Kennedy Mkutu and to USIU Lecturer & Internship Administrator Elsie Newa, who provided invaluable assistance in facilitating this workshop. Following the workshop, all Africa-based alumni were provided with 3 years’ complimentary membership to APSA and are encouraged to take part in the activities of the association as much as possible. This brings the APSA Africa Workshop alumni community up to a network of 230 scholars from across Africa and the United States.

**Workshop Leaders**
- John Clark
- Pamela K. Mbabazi
- Kennedy Mkutu
- Beth Elise Whitaker

**Workshop Fellows**
- Seidu Alidu
- Doreen Alusa
- Ndubuisi Christian Ani
- Tarila Ebiede
- Mary Ejang
- Dalaya Esayiyas
- Anne Fruge
- Temilola A. George
- Kevin Greene
- Ahmed Sharif Ibrahim
- Zachary A. Karazsia
- Kathleen Klaus
- Aditi Malik
- Lucy Massoi
- Bamlaku Tadesse Mengistu
- Enock Mudzamiri
- Odette Murara
- Mbangu Muyingi
- Eric Blanco Niyitunga
- Hassan Nijfom Njoya
- Christian Ifeanyi Onyekwelu
- Jacob Dut Chol Riak
- Kizito Sabala
- Josiane Tousse
- William John Walwa
- Corianne Wielenga
GRASSROOTS POLITICS IN AFRICAN ELECTIONS: A LOOK AT TANZANIA, CÔTE D’IVOIRE AND BURKINA FASO

INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM

By George Bob-Milliar (2012) and Jeffrey W. Paller (2012)

2015 is a busy year for elections in Africa. There were peaceful transfers of power in Nigeria and Lesotho, as well as nonviolent incumbent landslides in Sudan and Ethiopia. “Electoral October” was the busiest month, when citizens in Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Guinea went to the polls. Burkina Faso’s elections have been delayed until November. In all, a record number of Africans are voting in elections.

What do these elections mean for ordinary Africans? How do politicians consider the needs of their constituents in the current electoral environment? How do political parties mobilize support? Why do some elections turn violent while others remain peaceful?

As political scientists based inside and outside Africa, we are uniquely positioned to analyze African elections, and explain what they might mean for democratic prospects across the continent. This research symposium investigates African elections from a very specific vantage point: the grassroots.

Grassroots politics

Grassroots politics refers to the political operations and practices that originate from local communities. By researching the local neighborhoods and streets where electoral campaigns take place, a focus on grassroots politics exposes the interests, incentives, and motivations of the most important political actors in the context of daily life.

A focus on grassroots politics provides new insights into well-established political science theories and concepts. Scholarship on elections in Africa tends to emphasize voting behavior, political competition, and ethnicity. Scholars typically use election returns, census records, and household surveys to understand these concepts. In doing so, political scientists treat elections as fixed events. Elections are compared to other elections; electoral violence is compared to previous instances of electoral violence; and all other institutional progress and digression is swept aside.

But in emerging democracies a lot happens between elections, both good and bad. Power arrangements are re-shaped, societal transformations occur, and political institutions are strengthened and weakened. Perhaps even more importantly, the grassroots struggles that take place during the course of electoral campaigns are highly contentious (Bob-Milliar 2014). The grassroots is an important political arena that deserves its own attention. This research symposium shows how a close examination of the grassroots enriches our understanding of voting behavior, political
competition and mobilization, and identity politics.

Empirical case studies will focus on Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso. The major questions to be addressed include: What are the important grassroots political struggles of these elections? Who are the important grassroots political actors? How do political parties mobilize the grassroots? What do we miss if we neglect grassroots political dynamics? What do grassroots mean in these electoral contexts? What do political scientists gain theoretically by examining elections from the ground up?

Analyzing grassroots politics requires scholars to pay attention to four important dimensions of political decision-making: The subnational; historical grievances; informal political practices; and collective action.

Campaign posters during Kenya’s 2013 election

The subnational

The call to “scale down” the unit of political analysis to the local level launched a proliferation of comparative politics scholarship that emphasizes the importance of subnational contexts in understanding national level political phenomena, like democratization (Snyder 2001). Subnational units include regions, provinces, cities, villages, districts, neighborhoods, and even streets. A close examination of the subnational is important because the locus of political decision-making, avenues of civic participation, and the determinants of electoral competition are often rooted in subnational procedures and designations.

Voting behavior depends on the electoral district in which citizens make electoral decisions (Ichino and Nathan 2013). Avenues of political participation vary across constituencies and regions (Levan et al. 2015). Forms of political violence differ depending on levels of political competition, settlement patterns, and land tenure regimes (Boone 2014).

It is in these ways that grassroots politics is embedded in subnational units. Therefore, grassroots politics requires a close examination of struggles for political power at scales below the national sphere. By analyzing how grassroots politics compares across different subnational units, social scientists can draw inferences about how varying social conditions shape political behavior. This can help us understand a variety of political outcomes, including development, governance, participation, and political conflict.

Historical grievances

Grievances are perceptions of the wrongs and hardships that people suffer. They can be real or imagined, and they form the basis of legitimate complaints of ordinary people. Grassroots politics necessitates uncovering the grievances of individuals and groups because they can motivate political behavior, electoral strategies, and collective action.

There are many important grievances in African politics that continue to shape politics today. Most grievances are rooted in history, and date back to pre-colonial and colonial times. But specific grievances that continue to shape politics today include land grievances rooted in unequal access to property; resource grievances that are outcomes of unequal distributional policies; economic grievances that extend from poverty and inequality; and political grievances rooted in
unfair systems of representation.

Grassroots politics is often motivated by historical grievances. These perceptions of being wronged can become national political problems and challenges. For example, politicians have tapped into local land grievances to mobilize electoral violence in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire (Klaus and Mitchell 2015). Alternatively, grievances are often the impetus for political change, motivating citizens to take to the streets to demand change (Paller 2013).

Klaus and Zadi, in this volume, discuss how issues and concerns in peoples’ daily lives shaped their participation in Côte d’Ivoire’s national elections. Paying close attention to local land grievances, disarmament of ex-combatants, and the politics of the International Criminal Court, the authors show how individual interpretations of these grievances shaped their voting behavior, as well as how these sub-national patterns might affect post-election reconstruction efforts.

**Informal political practices**

Political scientists tend to focus on formal political practices like voting and law making. But informal political practices are just as important to African politics, and often shape official decision-making. Informal political practices are the unofficial interactions and engagements between different actors in the jockeying for power. Informal practices take place in the context of daily life, and often combine social customs and cultural norms.

Informal political practices in Africa include nighttime chats, house visits, radio declarations, and community gatherings. But they can also include practices that do not appear outwardly political, like church sermons, football cheers, and music concerts. It requires investigating the informal institutions that underlie political life, including those that shape norms of reciprocity at the local level (MacLean 2010). This is especially important because politicians rely on informal practices to gain a political following, which can contribute to political clientelism despite deepening democratization (Paller 2014).

Informal practices also involve non-state actors who play an important role in multi-party politics (Kushner and MacLean 2015). Youth activists affiliated to political parties in Ghana, who are commonly known as party foot soldiers use informal channels to mobilize votes for the party and candidate they support.

In this symposium, Nyamsenda exposes the informal political practices of Tanzania’s presidential candidates, and shows how they reinforce a neoliberal economic order.

Alternatively, Tanzania’s lower classes lose ownership of their own struggle, and are reduced to followers of churches, universities, media houses, companies, think tanks and NGOs.

It is often hard to separate informal political practices from grassroots mobilization. This is because politicians and political parties use informal practices to mobilize support (Klaus and Paller WP). Thus, informal political practices are central to how formal multi-party politics is played at the local level.

**Collective action**

Grassroots politics typically refers to the masses, or ordinary people who make up a polity. Collective action is participation by a group of people to achieve a common objective. Why people come together for a common purpose is an important aspect of grassroots politics. Uncovering the conditions that lead to collective action is an emerging topic in political science scholarship, and central to the study of grassroots politics.

Examples of collective action in African societies include protests and social movements (Branch and Mampilly 2015). But collective action can also have a dark side: it can lead to large-scale mass violence in the form of genocide or ethnic
cleansing (Straus 2015), as well as electoral violence. A focus on grassroots politics during African elections uncovers the roots of collective action, and helps explain when it will lead to positive change and when it might contribute to conflict.

In their ground-level analysis of politics in Burkina Faso, Ba and Eizenga in this issue show how grassroots collective action and social movements are shifting the political landscape of the country. The street protests demonstrate how ordinary people overcome the threat of violence, undermining the popular support of the incumbent party in the process.

**Elections through the lens of grassroots politics**

The study of grassroots politics is often examined separately from formal party politics. The grassroots is typically understood to be politics “from below,” while formal party politics is considered politics “from above.” But this symposium suggests moving beyond this neat dichotomy. Instead, the interests, incentives, and motivations of politicians and political parties during elections are illuminated through a close examination of the grassroots.

Investigating grassroots politics in African elections sheds light on why politicians mobilize in the ways that they do, and how citizens respond to various campaign messages. It also helps explain why some elections become violent, while others remain peaceful. Most importantly, it provides the necessary context to understand why candidates win, and explains what is at stake once the vote is tallied and the campaigning is over.

While “electoral October” has passed, the governing challenges have just begun. Understanding the key actors and institutions at the grassroots provides an important lens into the sources of political contestation for years to come.

**TANZANIA: GIANT PARTIES’ POLITICAL BANKRUPTCY AND GRASSROOTS ALTERNATIVES**

By Sabatho Nyamsenda*

Tanzania’s general elections were held on 25th October 2015 after about two months of electioneering. The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) emerged victorious in the Union elections with 58.49% of the presidential vote and a Parliamentary majority. The opposition Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) got 39.97% of the presidential vote.

Zanzibar election results were annulled by a unilateral decision of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission’s (ZEC) chairman over allegations of irregularities in Pemba, a stronghold of the opposition Civic United Front (CUF). It is said that the CUF had won the Zanzibar presidential elections.

**Big Party Politics**

To make sense of what has been going on politically in the country, one has to understand the characteristic of the neoliberal economic system.

Neoliberalism was ‘invented’ to restore monopoly capitalism whose blood – that is, rising surplus – was being sucked, albeit in little quantities, by labour through welfare policies. The neoliberal project launched successful attacks on welfarism and enhanced the power of a handful of giant corporations to control and exploit the world’s resources (Harvey 2005). In the political sphere, it is giant political parties that have the monopoly of politics. Political parties in the periphery function as subsidiaries of the major parties in the centre. For peripheral political parties to remain in the political map, their agenda has to complement – not contradict – with the main agenda set by central political parties. Just as

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oligopolies abolish price competition among themselves, so are the political parties (in the centre and their peripheral subsidiaries) which have abolished ideological competition.

Neoliberalism is also the most bankrupt shape of capitalism. Economically, the basis of accumulation is no longer (industrial) production which led to the improvement of productive forces. The neoliberal oligarchy accumulates through dispossession – either directly through outright plunder of resources (under the burner of FDI, privatisation, or even military invasions) or indirectly through speculative promotion of fictitious commodities, like the US subprime mortgages that caused the 2008 economic slump (Bello 2013; Harvey 2003).

Bankruptcy is also dominant in the political sphere where ideological debate is considered anachronistic. No wonder that CCM’s Magufuli and CHADEMA’s Lowassa turned down the offer of participating in a presidential debate (Kayera 2015). What was there for Tweedledee and Tweedledum, who have been ministers in previous governments and loyal implementers of neoliberalism, to debate about?

During the campaigns candidates rarely referred to their election manifestos. A formality, manifestos contain promises which are not meant for implementation. On launching his campaign, Lowassa told his spectators to go and read the manifesto from CHADEMA’s website knowing exactly that the majority of Tanzanians have no access to internet (Mwandishi Maalum 2015). A few members of the campaign teams of both parties that I interacted with were unaware of the contents of their manifestos.

The giant parties’ campaigns were dominated by slander, derision and insults which have now become the main vehicles of taking a person to Parliament. The presidential campaign stage turned into a movie stage and the best movie actor would harvest more votes. The superrich Lowassa, with a degree in performing arts, was innovative enough to shift his campaigns to the commuter buses to ‘learn the suffering of the ordinary people’ (Michuzi Blog 2015). His chief rival, Magufuli, had to come up with something different: dancing and performing pushups on the campaign stage to soothe his voters (CCM Blog 2015; Saanane 2015).

The “movie actors” in the presidential race also had to show their talents in making promises. There is nothing that they didn’t promise: everything would be free in the ‘paradise’ the candidate would create on the Tanzanian portion of the earth surface. Echoing the bible, Edward Lowassa promised that under his presidency “a person who eats a single meal shall eat two, one who owns one motor cycle or car shall get two, and he who has one wife shall get two” (Ngunje 2015; translated by this author).

The candidates had discovered that empty promises pay off from the outgoing president who won a landslide victory by promising “a better life for every Tanzanian”. This was an empty promise since Kikwete was a US stooge who did not have a programme to reforming the internally disarticulated and vertically integrated economy of Tanzania. According to a recent study by Twaweza and MIT, “many citizens report that politicians all make the same promises and cannot be trusted to keep these” (Rosenzweig and Tsai 2015).

Grassroots Struggles

We have so far analysed one aspect of Tanzanian politics – politics from above involving giant political parties. Political elections are therefore an intra-class race among the petty bourgeoisie for state power. The second aspect is politics from below. This involves struggles waged by popular classes for a decent life and against dispossession launched by giant corporations under the intermediary of the petty bourgeoisie. The giant parties always strive to hijack grassroots struggles by coopting and deliberately distorting the agenda of the latter in order to keep lower
classes in check. Once coopted, lower class members lose ownership and control of their struggle and are reduced to followers of a political messiah, created and promoted by a giant party in collaboration with other ideological state apparatuses like the churches, universities, media houses, private companies, think-tanks and NGOs.

If the petty bourgeoisie has managed to swallow the struggles of the masses, it has not completely succeeded to digest them. The masses have continued to struggle against both the local petty bourgeoisie and their international masters. It is in this regard that MVIWATA, a countrywide network of smallholder peasant groups, issued what they called a “Smallholder Peasants’ Manifesto Towards the 2015 General Elections” as an alternative to those issued by giant parties.

Part of the Peasant Manifesto’s preamble reads:

Considering the painful truth that the current policies concerning agriculture and the economy in general have been formulated without full participation of smallholder peasants and other working people,

And that those neoliberal policies have become the main source of poverty by simplifying the dispossession of jobs and land, and chemical spills on land and water sources, thus causing environmental pollution and endangering the lives of human beings and other species (MVIWATA 2015, 1 & 2).

Anchored on the language of class struggle, the Peasant Manifesto declares war against the local petty bourgeoisie: “Smallholder peasants will not accept being continually exploited and ruled by a group of few while they constitute a the country’s majority and are the chief producers of the country” (MVIWATA 2015: 5). It goes ahead and provides a set of economic, social and political demands which form a vision of the country that the peasants in alliance with other sectors of the working people (wavujajasho) want to build.

Economic demands are addressed mainly in section 4 of the Peasant Manifesto. Peasants propose among other things the reinstatement of “the leadership code as founded by Mwalimu Nyerere through the Arusha Declaration without diluting it” (MVIWATA 2015, 12). Government leaders and top and middle level bureaucrats, the Peasant Manifesto states, should be prohibited from engaging in any capitalist activities such as owning shares in capitalist companies or owning houses for rent. This means that leadership will become an avenue for serving the working people and not exploiting them.

To curb exploitation by an alliance of the international bourgeoisie (through their giant corporations) and local compradors (both in the government and private sectors), the Manifesto proposes the collective ownership and control of the means of production and exchange. The two modes of collective ownership are government as well as cooperatives (ibid: 13).

The Manifesto recognises that collectivisation/nationalisation without socialisation consolidates the power of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, as such it entrusts into lower-rank servants the role of guarding public entities on behalf of their fellow working poor (ibid). Furthermore, peasants “demand the establishment of industries, such as textile industries, etc so that the raw materials we produce are used locally, [thus] providing employment to our youth and building a self-sustaining economy” (ibid: 18).

The Peasant Manifesto’s social demands encompass social justice and equity. “Smallholder

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1 For a discussion on Ideological State Apparatuses see Althusser (1970).
2 All quotations from the Peasant Manifesto have been translated by the author from Kiswahili.
3 By dilution, the authors of the manifesto might have been referring to the Tabora Declaration, issued by a newly registered pseudo-socialist party, ACT–Wazalendo, as the 21st century version of the Arusha Declaration. The Tabora Declaration has reduced the leadership code to an act of declaring one’s (conflict of) interest. A splinter of the capitalist–oriented CHADEMA, ACT–Wazalendo is a party that billionaires can join and become leaders so long as they declare their wealth. It was not by surprise that the party’s leader, Zitto Kabwe, welcomed Lowassa to join the party given that he makes his wealth public (Gamaina 2015). Lowassa’s hope for presidency was halted by Nyerere in 1995 because of his controversial opulence.
peasants,” the manifesto says, “want to see the proper use of their taxes, and therefore [demand that] their taxes be used to provide social services to the urban and rural poor. Social services are not commodities: there must be an end to the selling education, healthcare, and potable water” (MVIWATA 2015). In their campaigns, the candidates from giant parties promised free healthcare while their party manifestos do not make such a commitment. Both manifestos talk about mobilizing citizens to join health insurance schemes where they will pay for themselves (CHADEMA 2015, 25; CCM 2015, 9). Thus, while peasants advocate for decommodification while the petty bourgeois think of recommodifying social services.

The political demands enshrined in the Peasant Manifesto offer an alternative to the bankrupt politics of giant parties and the 5-year elections. The manifesto envisions a grassroots system of democracy which gives the working people power to actively participate in the making and implementation of policies. The working people through their village and neighbourhood assemblies as well as their cooperatives and trade unions will be the centre stage of politics (MVIWATA 2015: 2–4).

As it has been discussed above, the demands of the working people range from working people’s collective ownership and control to social justice and self-sustenance. Only a few of these were incorporated in the manifestos of giant parties, and in a distorted manner. For example, industrialisation is mentioned in the manifestos of giant parties with the puny goal of reducing unemployment, and not resolving the question of exploitation by both internal and external agents. The working people should not expect the petty bourgeoisie to advocate for collective ownership and control or popular democracy, since for the latter to do so is tantamount to committing class suicide. To have their manifesto implemented the smallholder peasants will be an act of class struggle; the working people should therefore unite in pursuit of this struggle.

COTE D’IVOIRE’S 2015 ELECTIONS: LOCAL INTERESTS AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

By Kathleen Klaus (2015) and Patrick Anderson Zadi Zadi

On the 25th of October, Ivoirians voted in national elections. It was the first General election since the deadly post-election crisis in 2010–11, which left over 3,000 dead and as many one million people displaced (UNHCR 2015). As many analysts predicted, elections did not provoke violence and the sitting president, Alassane Ouattara won with an overwhelming majority of the ballots cast with 83.6 percent of the vote. The stability of these elections represents an important break from a history of election-related violence. But what do these national-level electoral outcomes reveal about post-conflict reconstruction and prospects for durable peace?

In this essay we suggest that an analysis of local-level or grassroots politics is critical for identifying the issues that can threaten the democratization process in Côte d’Ivoire. By focusing on the local we do not suggest that national politics do not matter. Instead, we mean that the issues and concerns in people’s daily lives shape how they interpret their political world—both at the local and national-level. And the issues that are most salient vary across the county—from fears of losing land, concerns about safety and security, beliefs about the justice

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* The Peasant Manifesto provides a broader definition of politics, which empowers the working people to control what they produce. “We, the smallholder peasants, shall not allow the food we produce go to produce fuel for cars to enable the rich of the West drive with comfort or used to feed animals to enable the rich of the West enjoy fat meat. The value of the food we produce is to feed our fellow human beings, especially the urban and rural poor, the majority of whom suffer from malnourishment diseases or even die of lack of sufficient food” (MVIWATA 2015: 18).

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* The National Electoral Commission released these results and the Constitutional Council confirmed them on 11/2/2015 in Abidjan.

* The 2000 elections were marked by fraud, boycotts, violent protests and the deaths of more than 150 people (Straus 2015). The next elections in 2010 escalated into mass violence.
process, to grievances over unequal access to jobs and developmental goods.

Identifying the relevant issues and understanding how they vary across regions of the Côte d’Ivoire is key to understanding patterns of voting behavior, but equally, for understanding the formation of armed groups, the rise of protests movements, and the escalation of violence. Taking a local-level approach also means a closer scrutiny of the October 2015 elections. While President Ouattara received 83.6 percent of the votes nationally, only 52.8 percent of the voting public cast their ballot (down from 80 percent in 2010) (Maïga et al. 2015).

Voter turnout ranged from over 88 percent in Ouattara’s core areas across the Northern regions, to under 40 percent across regions and departments that were former opposition strongholds (Abidjan.net 2015). We highlight two key issues that can help explain varying levels of voter participation, resistance, and potential violence: local grievances over land and resources and the politics of post-conflict justice.

Local Grievances in Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire’s economic boom in the early 1970s attracted many migrants from West Africa who settled in the west of the country, mostly as cocoa and coffee farmers. Relations between Ivoirian “hosts” and “migrants” were relatively peaceful until the 1990s, when the cocoa sector collapsed and the new regime implemented a set of nativist laws. With the collapse, youth could no longer secure jobs in the urban areas. As they returned home to family farms, many discovered that their families had sold land to migrants. This pushed many young autochthons to try to re-claim land from migrants. The rhetoric and legislation of the new ultra-nationalist regime empowered these claims. With the start of the civil war in 2002, disputes over land ownership in Western Côte d’Ivoire helped to fuel violent mobilization and inter-group attacks (Babo 2010; Konan 2011). Throughout the war and the post-election crisis, some of the highest levels of violence occurred in the Cavally and Guemon regions of the west, where there are deep and unresolved land grievances. Despite high expectations, Ouattara’s government has done little to reform the 1998 Land Law that excludes non-Ivoirians from owning land. As a result, there is not a reliable mechanism in place for adjudicating land disputes.7

In the recent elections, opposition groups and local politicians used the land issue to mobilize support. On one side, civilians who fled their land during the 2010-11 election crisis sought a politician who could help them re-claim their land from “migrants.” Many of these displaced Ivoirian were Guere “natives” who went into exile when Ouattara defeated their candidate, Laurent Gbagbo. Referring to the land issue as a “bomb,” the leading opposition candidate Affi N’Guessan said that conflict would not end until land issues were resolved.

Another opposition candidate, Kouadio Konan Bertin, emphasized that migrants and “foreigners” from Burkina Faso were illegally occupying forestland. On the other side of this debate, Ouattara supporters—many of whom are migrants—hoped his party would promote an arrangement to help migrants keep their land. But Ouattara’s government has done little to resolve the land issues on either side, fueling a renewed set of land grievances (Le Mandat 2013; Airaault 2013). It is possible therefore, that as more pro-Gbagbo supporters return from exile, ownership disputes may again help foment the escalation of violence.

Disarmament of Ex-Combatants

In September 2002, an armed group led by mostly northern soldiers launched an attack to overthrow the regime of Laurent Gbagbo (Hamer 2011). One of their main objectives was to force an end to the ethnically exclusive policies of Ivoirité that worked to exclude northerners, Muslims, or non-

7 Interview in Divo town, Sud-Bandama Region, 2013.
Ivoirians from claiming citizenship rights. The attempted coup turned into a civil war where rebels gained control over 60 percent of the country (Guillaume 2005).\(^8\) While the coup eventually failed, it was a critical turning point in Côte d’Ivoire: enflaming a xenophobic and ultranationalist discourse among “natives” and leading to greater militarization across the country. One of the many important outcomes of this period was the organization and proliferation of parallel armed forces. These groups emerged alongside formal Defense and Security Forces (FDS) and included youth wings, armed militias, and death squads (Straus 2015: 124).

While armed groups formed in defense of Gbagbo and Ouattara, Gbagbo’s party organized some of the most violent armed groups. In the south, one of the most prominent of these groups is a youth movement called the “Young Patriots” (Hellweg 2011: 218). In the west, militia groups included the Ivorian Movement for the Liberation of Western Côte d’Ivoire (MILOCI) and the Resistance Forces of the Grand West (FRGO). On the pro-Ouattara side, the MPCI led the coup in September 2002 and occupied the north. The MPCI was later renamed the Forces Nouvelles in December 2002 and then the Forces Républicaines de la Côte d’Ivoire in March 2011.\(^9\) It also supported armed groups in the west including the Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) (Guillame 2005: 86). The dozos—or traditional hunters from the north—were also part of these opposition forces. After Ouattara secured power in 2011 the Forces Nouvelles became the Forces Républicaines de la Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), the official national army of Côte d’Ivoire.

One of the main security challenges in the post-conflict period is the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants who participated in these militia groups. Ouattara’s government created the Authority for Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (ADDR). Under the program, combatants are supposed to hand in their weapons in exchange for access to housing, money, or jobs in public administration or the security forces. But there are several problems with the implementation of the ADDR.

First, former rebel leaders, many of whom hold positions in the army, have significant influence over this process (Reuters 2015). This means that they can still act in the capacity of the patron, controlling those who enter and benefit from the ADDR program. One implication, as many critics point out, is that the ADDR process has favored former combatants in the pro-Ouattara forces without offering similar compensation to pro-Gbagbo fighters. According to Human Rights Watch, only an estimated 13 percent of pro-Gbagbo groups have been disarmed (Human Rights Watch 2015), despite the Government’s claims that they have reintegrated 85 percent of ex-combatants. Media reports from May 2015 also indicate that the number of ex-combatants entering the ADDR program far exceeds the number of weapons collected (Reuters 2015). This means that former fighters on both sides are holding onto their weapons. Among former pro-Ouattara rebels, some express a sense of betrayal by the government. Fighters have “given their lives” for the President, yet many feel that the reintegration process is incomplete or lacks adequate compensation (Agence France-Presse 2015). One implication of these asymmetries in the ADDR process is that many ex-combatants remain un-registered or in exile, or aggrieved by a sense of partisan and ethnic bias.

The politics of the ICC

Another dimension of post-conflict justice concerns the prosecution of Gbagbo and other high-ranking officials from his party at the International Criminal Court. In the four years since Gbagbo’s arrest and transfer to the Hague in 2011, the ICC has only brought charges against pro-Gbagbo officials but has

\(^8\) Hellweg 2011 mentions also the North - South divide but does not give a percent of the territory seized by the rebels (217).
\(^9\) For more details on the formation of armed groups under Ouattara, see: Fofana 2011.
not presented any charges against allies of Ouattara. The “one-sided” focus of the ICC prosecution has led many Ivoirians and external observers to question the partiality of the justice process. These claims of “victor’s justice” have increased polarization between groups and undermined the legitimacy of the ICC in the eyes of former Gbagbo supporters (Human Rights Watch 2015c).

During the recent election campaign, the opposition claimed that some pro-Ouattara allies should be sent to the ICC for crimes against humanity (Human Rights Watch 2015c). Some pointed to the many mass graves that have been discovered since 2002 in the zones once under rebel control (Le Congalais 2012; Abidjan.net 2012). Some Ivoirians believe that the ICC should also prosecute Soro Guillaume, the current president of parliament and the General Secretary of the Forces Nouvelles. Some also argue that the ICC should indict Ouattara because of his role in organizing the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI)—the former militia group that has become the country’s official army. The main opposition candidate, Affi N’Guessan Pascal of FPI, exploited the perceived inequality in the justice process to mobilize electoral support, particularly in Western Côte d’Ivoire where former President Gbagbo drew much of his support.

Most Ivoirians assume that the ICC will convict Gbagbo. And this outcome alone is unlikely to provoke violence or protest. But the one-sidedness of the justice process has deepened divisions between Gbagbo and Ouattara supporters. Gbagbo supporters view the process as “justice for the winners” and injustice and inequality for opposition members. If members of Ouattara’s coalition are not prosecuted at the ICC or in domestic courts, grievances over unequal justice may exacerbate divisions, particularly at the grassroots.

Further, perceptions of unequal justice are compounded by the broader sense of unequal opportunities for opposition members. These Ivoirians argue that it is much harder to secure a job in the public administration if someone is not a northerner or Ouattara supporter. Ivoirians refer to this northern bias as le rattrapage ethnique or “ethnic catch-up.” Finally, it is possible that if the opposition (i.e. pro-Gbagbo supporters) gains political power, attempts to seek revenge and “settle scores” may lead to the escalation of violence.

In this essay we’ve analyzed how land ownership disputes, post-conflict disarmament, and the politics of the ICC can strengthen or fuel divisions among citizens at the sub-national level. In thinking about the implications for grassroots politics, we suggest that scholars should pay greater attention to how these issues are interpreted and experienced at the very local-level. Variation in the meaning or salience of each of these issues depends partly on the dynamics of land claims, the history of violence, and the dominant political and ethnic identification of an area. Looking at how broad national issues play out in different ways across the country can help explain why certain regions are more vulnerable to violence and insecurity, how people vote, and why some citizens choose to opt out of the formal political process—especially in contexts where citizens believe that the government has forgotten or marginalized them.

MOBILIZING FOR ELECTIONS: THE BURKINABÉ CONTEXT

By Oumar Ba and Daniel Eizenga (2013)*

Presidential and legislative elections in Burkina Faso, originally scheduled for October 11, 2015, were postponed following an attempted military coup led by the presidential guard (Regiment de Sécurité Présidentielle, RSP) on September 16. These elections would have concluded a nearly year long political transition following the popular uprising which brought down the ‘electoral authoritarian’ regime of Blaise Compaoré (Schedler 2013). Instead, the RSP threatened to destabilize the entire country as it

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took the interim President, Michel Kafando, and Prime Minister, Yacouba Isaac Zida, hostage, suspended the transitional government, and pronounced itself in control of the country.

The coup ultimately failed, however, when protests—similar to those which forced Compaoré to resign from the presidency after twenty-seven years in power—erupted throughout the country against the RSP. The international community and the national military recognized that Burkinabè would not accept the RSP’s attempt to hijack the country’s political transition and threw their support behind the transitional government. This left the RSP little choice but to stand down and disarm. After years of rule under Compaoré, the Burkinabè people rejected any possibility of a return to authoritarian governance by once again taking to the streets at a decisive moment.

The actions of the Burkinabè people demonstrate the potential of social movements to shift the balance of power across the seemingly invincible hegemonic party regimes which characterize much of sub-Saharan Africa. Grassroots mobilization is transforming the political landscape of this West African nation and elsewhere across the continent. But how did this grassroots mobilization crystallize over the years before shaping Burkina Faso’s new political trajectory in 2014?

In October 2014 hundreds of thousands demonstrated in the streets of Ouagadougou during what would become known as the “insurrection populaire” (popular uprising) which brought down the Compaoré regime. Former president, Blaise Compaoré, took power after orchestrating his own military coup in 1987 and went on to win four presidential elections. His final presidential term should have ended in 2015, but Compaoré and his party, the Congrès pour la Democarcy et le Progrès (CDP) sought to bypass the term limits by proposing a bill of law at the National Assembly. Had this gone through, there was no doubt that it would have passed, thanks to the CDP’s super-majority. But Compaoré and the CDP ignored a crucial political development: a shifting political landscape allowed grassroots mobilization efforts to expand and strengthen during their twenty-seven years in power. The citizenry would not remain idle in the face of an authoritarian regime.

During Compaoré’s reign, civil society won the space and freedom to develop into a strong social force. After the 1998 political assassination of investigative journalist Norbert Zongo, numerous civil society movements, unions, and other social actors coalesced in protest against the regime’s authoritarian tendencies. The movement, known as ‘Trop C’est Trop’ (‘Enough is Enough’) pressured the Compaoré regime to concede a number of political reforms (Hagberg 2002). These reforms weakened the regime by strengthening a burgeoning civil society and the political opposition which nearly won a legislative majority following the 2002 elections (Santiso and Loada 2002).

As it became clear that Compaoré would attempt to change the constitution, many of the same civil society organizations and unions joined forces with new popular and youth-led movements, such as Le Balai Citoyen, to oppose Compaoré’s plans. These movements stormed the Parliament on 30 October 2014 to prevent the National Assembly from voting on the controversial bill. The protests successfully called for Compaoré’s resignation, and the now renowned popular uprising set the stage for the current political transition.

The transitional government, however, faced a number of challenges as it began the process of leading the country to elections and simultaneously seeking to reform many of the Compaoré regime’s past practices. Amongst the greatest challenges on both of these counts were Compaoré’s former presidential guard, the RSP, and his political party, the CDP.

The RSP attempted to guarantee its future and avoid reform by influencing the appointment of the interim prime minister. Michel Kafando, a
A retired diplomat was tapped to be the interim president and was subsequently pressured into appointing Lieutenant Colonel Zida as his prime minister. This played directly into the RSP’s hands. Zida was, after all, the RSP’s second-in-command. However, as the transition progressed it became clear that Zida’s own personal political ambitions outweighed previous allegiances to his former military unit. Zida made moves and supported reforms to distance himself from the widely unpopular RSP which was implicated in a number of nefarious activities during the nearly three decades of Compaoré’s rule.

Meanwhile, leaders and elites within the CDP challenged the transition’s leaders who helped support the popular uprising that ousted Compaoré. Political elites decided to reprimand the CDP for supporting the modification of presidential term limits. The legislative body of the transitional government, which is composed primarily of political actors who opposed the modification of presidential term limits, undertook a project to reform the electoral code. The reform was passed along with a new article which stipulates that anyone who supported Compaoré’s proposed modification would be barred from contesting the 2015 elections.

Despite an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) court ruling that deemed this reform illegal, the Burkinabè Constitutional Court upheld the reform barring numerous prominent leaders of the CDP from the presidential and legislative elections. These elite political battles played a limited role in the lives of ordinary Burkinabè citizens until General Gilbert Diendéré, leader of the RSP and long-time ally of Blaise Compaoré, took matters into his own hands by launching the coup of September 2015.

Diendéré likely had two reasons for attempting the coup. First, the coup would ensure that the country held ‘inclusive elections,’ the CDP candidates would be able to participate (many of these CDP members are close political allies of Diendere). Second, the coup served as an attempt to preserve the RSP, given that the National Reconciliation and Reform Commission had just recommended that the RSP be disbanded.

Yet, much like Compaoré and the CDP had underestimated popular sentiment against the modification of presidential term limits, Diendéré and his co-conspirators underestimated the level of support for the political transition. Prior to the coup, popular opinion regarding the dissolution of the RSP and the exclusion of the CDP seemed indifferent, or at least ambiguous. Both issues featured in the media and Burkinabè were no doubt aware of them, but the debates surrounding the RSP and CDP remained largely confined to the halls of political elites. That changed dramatically with the RSP’s coup which temporarily suspended the transition.

Protests immediately took place against the coup in the streets of the capital and within a few days popular demonstrations spread throughout urban centers across the country. The demonstrations differed from those of the ‘popular insurrection.’ The coup had taken the leaders of social movements by surprise, leaving them little time to prepare and organize mass demonstrations. The RSP launched an organized attack on their opponents, targeting civil society leaders and communications providers. Additionally, in Ouagadougou the RSP held an organizational advantage by securing key points within the capital and establishing repressive patrols which used force to disperse crowds. However, where the RSP lacked a strong presence—outside of the capital—peaceful protests of thousands of people in several cities and towns demonstrated a countrywide rejection of the coup.

The widespread nature of the demonstrations signaled to both the international community and more importantly the national military that the Burkinabè people would not tolerate the RSP in power. The national military moved against the RSP in Ouagadougou while an ECOWAS mediation team brought a peace proposal to its leaders at a special summit in Abuja.
The national military issued an ultimatum for the RSP to disarm, and the ECOWAS summit concluded by calling for the restoration of the transitional government. This effectively ended the RSP-led coup. In the days that followed, tensions occasionally flared as certain elements of the RSP refused to turn over their weapons, but ultimately the elite-unit did disarm and was dissolved into the national military.

Much like the events of the 2014 popular uprising which ousted Compaoré from power, the popular mobilization of Burkinabè citizens and their willingness to take to the streets even under the threat of violence during the RSP-led coup, again dictated the terms of their country's political development. The countrywide mobilization of ordinary citizens thwarted the goals of the RSP and, ultimately, these grassroots mobilizations served to reinforce the political transition at a crucial moment.

The CDP lost a significant amount of political support; the party’s hopes of being included in the next elections evaporated with the coup’s failure. With the vast majority of Burkinabè turned against the party, the CDP announced that it would support candidates approved by the Constitutional Court in both the presidential and legislative elections now re-scheduled for 29 November 2015. Additionally, several well-known politicians, many of whom held high positions in the Compaoré regime, have since been arrested for their involvement in the organization of the coup. These actions open political space for a new political leadership to emerge in Burkina Faso.

Thanks to massive grassroots mobilization, Burkinabè politicians can no longer afford to be associated with the practices of the former regime. Indeed, association with the former ruling party, or president, in the post-popular uprising era is now tantamount to political isolation and exclusion. Still, after nearly thirty years in power, almost all of the presidential hopefuls have past connections to Compaoré and the CDP. What remains to be seen is whether they will be able to make a clean break from the practices of the former regime once elected. If not, they may face the same kind of grassroots mobilization which brought down the Compaoré regime and ensured that the political transition was completed.

In the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, political science scholars and analysts have grappled with the ways in which contentious politics from the streets translates into political change and what these popular movements mean for democratic transitions. As recent grassroots politics have sprung up in Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, in addition to the student protests in South Africa and the challenge that the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) pose to ANC hegemony, there is no doubt that Africa serves as a fertile ground for scholarship on how contentious politics supports or derails democratic trajectories.

Furthermore, whereas in the past the military generally played the dominant role in such brusque changes in political trajectories, there are signs that the citizenry and civil society movements have adopted an increasingly engaged role. This suggests that scholars need to expand their thinking on civil-military relations to investigate further where it intersects with civil society. This is perhaps especially pertinent within electoral authoritarian regimes across the continent. It is important to not only view African politics as revolving around the critical moments that constitute elections, but to pay more attention to the longer process of institutional reform, and the building, sustaining and maturing of popular movements. In the case of Burkina Faso such movements have demonstrated a clear potential to dramatically shift the balance of power when the time is ripe for engagement.
INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM


TANZANIA: GIANT PARTIES’ POLITICAL BANKRUPTCY AND GRASSROOTS ALTERNATIVES


CCM. 2015. “Ilini ya CCM Kwa Ajili ya Uchaguzi Mkuu wa Mwaka 2015”.


CÔTE D’IVOIRE’S 2015 ELECTIONS: LOCAL INTERESTS AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE


**MOBILIZING FOR ELECTIONS: THE BURKINABÉ CONTEXT**


Announcements

ALUMNI NETWORKING GRANTS

Applications for the final round of Alumni Networking Grants were due on November 8, 2015. Made possible by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the grants program supported alumni participation in activities such as presenting at an academic conference, organizing a mini-workshop, or advancing current research towards publication. Since August 2013, APSA has awarded over $97,000 in small grants to 34 Africa Workshops alumni. Recent recipients include:

May 2015
- Abubakar Abdullahi (2014) – $1,400 Professional Development Grant
- Naomi Moswete (2012) – $1,200 Professional Development Grant
- Peace Medie (2010) – $1,200 Professional Development Grant

August 2015
- Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai (2014) – $1,200 Professional Development Grant
- Ndubuisi Christian Ani (2015) – $232 Professional Development Grant
- George Bob-Milliar (2012) – $1,500 Professional Development Grant
- Enock Mudzamiri (2015) – $713 Professional Development Grant
- Yacouba Ouedraogo (2013) – $1,223 Professional Development Grant

Congratulations to these alumni! Additional information can be found online at http://community.apsanet.org/Africa/alumnigrants.

WEST AFRICAN RESEARCH ASSOCIATION FELLOWSHIPS

The 2016 WARA Fellowship competition is open for applications. This year WARA will be funding awards for research at pre- and post-doctoral levels, a Diaspora graduate internship in West Africa, the WARC Library Fellowship, and, for Institutional members, the WARA Residency Fellowship. Application deadlines vary based on the fellowship. You can view and download information and the application on the WARA website by clicking here.

ALUMNI NEWS AND PUBLICATIONS

Over the past year, many of our alumni (both participants and co-leaders) were invited to present their research and participate in conferences across the United States, including 32 alumni at APSA’s Annual Meeting in San Francisco, CA this September, and 34 alumni at the African Studies Association’s Annual Meeting in San Diego, CA next week. See “Project News” on the website for more information.

If you would like to submit an announcement to be included in future Alumni News, send your updates directly to africannewsletter@apsanet.org. Please join us in congratulating the following alumni for their continued professional accomplishments!
2008 Alumni – Dakar, Senegal
- Robin Harding has moved from the University of Rochester to the University of Oxford, where he is now an Associate Professor of Government.

2010 Alumni – Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- Peace Medie (University of Ghana) published her article “Women and Post-conflict Security: A Study of Police Response to Domestic Violence in Liberia” in the September 2015 issue of Politics & Gender vol. 11, no. 3.
- Alice Kang (University of Nebraska-Lincoln) published her book Bargaining for Women’s Rights: Activism in an Aspiring Muslim Democracy with University of Minnesota Press

2011 Alumni – Nairobi, Kenya
- Carl LeVan (American University) and Joseph Olayinka Fashagba (Landmark University) co-edited the book African State Governance: Subnational Politics and National Power, published by Palgrave Macmillan, which includes chapters by Yahaya Baba, Westen Shilaho, Solomon Gofie, and Majuta Mamogale.
- Carl LeVan (American University) published his co-authored article “Parties or Portfolio? The Economic Consequences of Africa’s Big Cabinets” in Government and Opposition, available January 2015 FirstView

2012 Alumni – Gaborone, Botswana
- Abosede Omowumi Babatunde (University of Ilorin) published her article “Youth uprising and the quest for political reform in Africa” in the April 2015 issue of African Security Review vol. 24, no. 2.
- Danielle Carter Kushner (St. Mary’s College of Maryland) and Lauren MacLean (Indiana University) co-edited the fall 2015 special issue of Africa Today (vol. 62, no. 1) on “The Politics of Non-state Provision of Public Goods in Africa” which also features articles by Fatai Ayinde Aremu, Mesharch Katusiimeh, and Jeffrey Paller
- Jeffrey Paller (Columbia University) received the 2014 African Politics Conference Group-Lynne Riener Award for Best Dissertation in African Politics.
- George Bob-Milliar has been promoted to Senior Lecturer and appointed as the new Chair of the Department of History and Political Studies at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science & Technology. He is also celebrating the birth of his daughter, Mwin-Vielu, on October 2, 2015. He is happy to say that mother and baby are doing well!

2013 Alumni – Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
- Doris Ezazouambela completed his PhD in Social and Cultural Anthropology at the Ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (L’EHESS) in Paris, France.
- Blessing Nonye Onyima (Nnamdi Azikiwe University) published her co-authored article “New Dimensions to Pastoralists-Farmers Conflicts and Sustainable Agricultural Development in Agadama and Uwheru Communities, Niger Delta” in the September 2015 issue of African Security vol. 8, no. 3. It is available open access: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/qi6U9N5eNKRJA9qJTKVC/full
• Moses Aluaigba (Bayero University, Kano) has co-authored the recent book *Insurgency and Human Rights in Northern Nigeria*, published by the Centre for Information and Development (CITAD), Kano, Nigeria.


2014 Alumni – Maputo, Mozambique

• Laura Freeman (University of Cape Town) published her article “The African warlord revisited” in the November 2015 issue of *Small Wars & Insurgencies* vol. 26, no. 5. It is available open access: [http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2015.1072318](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2015.1072318)

• Sylvia Croese (Stellenbosch University) published her article “Inside the Government but Outside the Law: Residents’ Committees, Public Authority and Twilight Governance in Post-War Angola” in the March 2015 issue of the *Journal of Southern African Studies* vol. 41, no. 2.


2015 Alumni – Nairobi, Kenya

• Tarila Marclint Ebide (University of L) has accepted a one-year fellowship with the Security, Conflict and Resilience (SECURE) programme at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), a research think tank in Maastricht, Netherlands.

• Beth Elise Whitaker (University of North Carolina, Charlotte) published her article “Playing the Immigration Card: the politics of exclusion in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana” in the June 2015 issue of *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* vol. 53, no. 3. It is available open access: [http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14662043.2015.1051289](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14662043.2015.1051289)

• Beth Elise Whitaker (University of North Carolina–Charlotte) published her co-authored article “Political Competition and Attitudes towards Immigration in Africa” in the January 2015 issue of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* vol. 41, no. 10.

• Kennedy Mkutu Agade (United States International University) published his article “Changes and Challenges of the Kenya Police Reserve: The Case of Turkana County” in the April 2015 issue of *African Studies Review* vol. 58, no. 1.

• Kathleen Klaus (Northwestern University) published her co-authored article “Land grievances and the mobilization of electoral violence: Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya” in the September 2015 issue of *Journal of Peace Research* vol 52, no. 5.
Catherine Lena Kelly and Willy Kalala (Workshop 2013). Catherine passed through Kinshasa in October 2015 as part of her work as a program evaluator for the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative's judicial strengthening program, the African Center for Justice. Willy is now a teaching assistant at the University of Kinshasa.

Andrew Stinson and Catherine Boone at APSA 2015.

Photo time! Africa Workshop 2015 “in the field.”
Bargaining for Women’s Rights: Activism in an Aspiring Muslim Democracy

By Alice J. Kang

“Alice J. Kang compellingly argues that governments are more likely to adopt women’s rights reforms when local activists mobilize for them, that opposing activists must also be considered, and that political context is essential for understanding outcomes around women’s rights.” – Gretchen Bauer, University of Delaware

African State Governance: Subnational Politics and National Power

Edited by A. Carl Levan, Joseph Olayinka Fashagba, and Edward R. McMahon

“This stimulating analysis of subnational politics across key states in sub-Saharan Africa provides an empirically nuanced and in-depth account of the policies and practices of devolution. The institutional focus takes seriously the congruence between national and subnational; formal and informal; party structure, fiscal federalism, judicial independence and the electoral system. Wrestling with challenging issues such as ethnic competition, the resource curse, and continued executive dominance, the authors place subnational governance in context to assess democratic development, representation, accountability and governance.” – Rachel Beatty Riedl, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University, USA

Women and Power in Post-Conflict Africa

By Aili Mari Tripp

“This book answers a question asked by policy-makers charged with supporting women’s empowerment: do women in power make a positive difference? The answer, supported here with robust evidence, is yes. Professor Tripp’s rich case study evidence shows the conditions under which women in postconflict African countries have helped build inclusive policies, get agrarian economies back on their feet, and advance women’s rights. Democracy, poverty reduction, and justice are at the core of conflict prevention. This book shows how women’s leadership is essential to achieving peace in Africa.” – Anna Marie Goetz, New York University